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Idling the Engine by E. Joseph Sharkey is the book I have long been waiting for, but did not think I would ever see published. I say this after years of suffering in silence at graduate and faculty seminars, at which I felt unable to counter the prevailing academic orthodoxy that there is no such thing as “truth” because, to quote Sharkey’s summary of the orthodoxy, “no knowledge or tool of knowledge, least of all language, can be trusted” (viii). What I found particularly insidious, not to say pernicious, was the unquestioned view that historiography is but another kind of fiction. Here the slide, not to say sleight of hand, is evident. From the perfectly acceptable, indeed innocuous, view that the historical record is subject to interpretation and reinterpretation – that, for example, neither Michelet nor Simon Schama has written the definitive study of the French Revolution – we are asked to endorse the totally unacceptable position that any account of a historical event is a fictional construct to be “deconstructed”. Try telling victims of the Shoah that the history of the Final Solution needs to be “deconstructed”! That of course is precisely what the Holocaust-denial movement seeks to achieve. But scholars who would not be seen dead in the company of such people embrace in other contexts much the same idea, summed up two millennia ago by Pontius Pilate in his notorious question, “What is truth?”
	For the Pilates of this world, Professor Sharkey points out, “no knowledge is to be trusted because everything is suspect until a justification can be provided for it” (viii). This distrust, he says, is born largely of noble impulses like the wish to combat conscious or unconscious prejudice. The consequence, however, is to push doubt to nonsensical extremes: “the standards required for certainty are unreasonable and even impossible; when ‘justification’ is called for, it is ‘absolute justification’ that is really meant - this in a world without absolutes” (viii). He quotes admiringly Charles Altieri’s observation: “It may well be the case that we have no absolutely secure grounds for truth, but the more important question is whether we need these grounds for coherent discourse” (viii n). Sharkey’s answer to Altieri’s question is that we do not need them, and I agree with him. I find it curious that academics, who on the whole are agnostics where the alleged “truths” of revealed religion are concerned, seem to think that total certainty, absolute truth, can be attained in other fields. Or rather, that since it cannot be attained, they would put Schama’s history of the French Revolution on a par with the Gospel of Mark.
	Sharkey brings insight, logic and, above all, common sense to bear on the artificial dilemmas of postmodern linguistic and aesthetic theory. He cites Gadamer and Wittgenstein in support of his critique, which is courageous of him because, as he points out, their philosophies of language are “often taken to serve a skeptical, subversive cause by exposing language as unjustified and therefore untrustworthy” (viii). Sharkey draws on their writings to argue the opposite, namely “that such extreme distrust betrays an unreasonable, even puerile, rejection of the finitude of human being and understanding” (viii). Worse, when we scorn truth for not equaling Truth, and beauty for falling short of Beauty, what we are really doing is scorning ourselves “for not being God” (x).
Sharkey is quite right, of course. When Wittgenstein declared in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that “the limits of my language are the limits of my world” and “what we cannot put into words we must consign to silence”, he was far from claiming that language is not fit for purpose. Instead, he was arguing that language is finite, as we are; or, as he graphically put it, “a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water even if I were to pour a gallon into it” (259).
	After bringing such thinking to bear on Paradise Lost and on works by Cortázar, Kafka and Joyce, Sharkey’s conclusion is masterly: 

Ulysses, I would like to say, is Joyce’s teacup, and he has no interest in attempting to force the transcendent into it. Yet there is such a thing as surface tension. In his vast, minute representation of this world, Joyce fills the teacup of language so high that the tea rounds subtly above the border of its container, and if it does not spill over, it threatens to do so. Joyce’s teacup thus holds more than a teacup, and finite language points beyond
finitude (260).                              

Likewise one can assert with confidence that just because historiography can never be definitive, that does not make it just another kind of fiction. 
Michael Wood is almost as well known as an expert on cinema as he is for writing major critical studies of Stendhal, Nabokov and Kafka (the latter cited in Idling the Engine, 158n). References to a wide range of fiction and poetry as well as to film classics abound in Literature and the Taste of Knowledge, a revised version of the Empson Lectures which he delivered in Cambridge in 2003. They must have been fascinating to listen to; they are certainly a pleasure to read. They do honor to the great critic under whose aegis they were given: like Empson’s own writings, they display a breadth of reference and lightly-worn erudition expressed in a lively, often witty style. (It’s slightly to be regretted that Wood felt obliged to drop “the local jokes where they wouldn’t travel beyond the [Cambridgeshire] Fens” [ix].)
Professor Wood’s concern is remarkably close to Professor Sharkey’s: the question pondered in these lectures is whether literature offers us knowledge of its own or merely interprets and questions other forms of knowledge. Wood’s premise is that literature is a form of pretence, but a pretence that can, and usually does, “tilt us into the real”, because “there is no paradise of metaphor where our poems, plays and novels have no truck at all with the harsh and shifting world” (back-cover note). A chapter entitled “Kafka and the Third Reich” asks the question whether the great writer who died in 1924 foresaw - even “foresuffered”, in T.S. Eliot’s phrase - the univers concentrationnaire in which his friend Milena Jesenská later met her death. In another chapter, John Banville’s novel Shroud is analyzed to see what, in Banville’s hands, becomes of Paul de Man’s trajectory from youthful anti-Semitic journalist in Belgium to much-lauded scholar and literary critic in the United States: “a great deal, in one sense; almost nothing, in another” (182). 
But to my mind the most impressive lecture is the one devoted to Henry James and The Wings of the Dove. “It’s worth remembering”, Wood says, “that novels can be deeply preoccupied with morality without offering any moralizing” (29). Could it be, he wonders, that “the novel is a moral skeptic, even if [the novelist] isn’t?” (29) This chimes with something I wrote about Iris Murdoch years ago, long before her death and the subsequent rather sordid revelations about her personal life, in particular her duplicity toward her many lovers (male and female). I argued that her depiction of her characters, and of her morally-flawed characters in particular, shows that she is human: if the persona in her essays on moral philosophy (she was a professional philosopher as well as a novelist) is, to use her own terms, “good”, the implied author of the novels is merely “nice”. People, she shows, are by definition imperfect, and that includes herself. 
Like Henry James, whom she revered, Iris Murdoch does not pass judgment on her characters but, treating her readers as a sort of literary jury, leaves them free to convict or to acquit them. What I once called “a kind of appalled recoil” at the morally questionable behavior of a character in A Fairly Honorable Defeat is registered by the autonomous reader; it is not prompted by any hint planted by the implied author in the text.
Albert Camus allows us a similar freedom in his greatest work, L’Étranger. On any objective assessment of the novel the leading character Meursault is guilty of murder in the first degree, but we, his readers, acquit him in the tribunal of our hearts and minds. This is because - as Wood and Sharkey would, I am sure, agree - L’Etranger, like the works they discuss, is a “moral skeptic” (29). Wood’s phrase is telling: a great novel “rattles not our morals but our sense of their reasonableness” (34). So too do such masterpieces as Bleak House, Crime and Punishment, Anna Karenina, Madame Bovary, Middlemarch, and The Portrait of a Lady.
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